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Logic and Plurals∗
1 The logical analysis of plural expressions
Many natural languages contain plural vocabulary such as ‘we’, ‘those’, ‘the philoso-
phers’, ‘cooperate’, and ‘gathered’. What is the correct logical analysis of sentences
involving such vocabulary?
Before we can attempt to answer the question, we need to comment briefly on
how we understand logical analysis. Logical analysis generally proceeds by para-
phrasing sentences of natural language in a way that provides a more perspicuous
representation of logically relevant features of the given sentences. Often, the para-
phrase is given in a formal language that is equipped with a deductive system and a
model-theoretic semantics. However, as Quine observed, “to paraphrase a sentence
of ordinary language into logical symbols is virtually to paraphrase it into a special
part still of ordinary or semi-ordinary language [...].” (Quine 1960: 159) This is be-
cause, in many important cases, the sentences of the formal language are obvious
counterparts of particular sentences of natural language (or natural language aug-
mented with some mathematical locutions). The process of paraphrase into a more
logically perspicuous fragment of natural language is known as regimentation.
Though the logical study of plurals is a relatively recent phenomenon, semantic
questions concerning plurals were already entertained by the founders of modern
logic.1 Frege himself, for instance, addressed the question of the proper logical
analysis of sentences with a plural subject, such as (1).
(1) Socrates and Plato are philosophers.
He wrote:
[W]e have two thoughts: Socrates is a philosopher and Plato is a philoso-
pher, which are only strung together linguistically for the sake of con-
venience. Logically, Socrates and Plato is not to be conceived as the
subject of which being a philosopher is predicated. (Frege 1980: 40)
∗[Acknowledgments]
1For historical details, see Oliver and Smiley 2013, chapter 2.
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In effect, Frege proposes to analyze (1) as (2).
(2) Socrates is a philosopher and Plato is a philosopher.
However, he realizes that this strategy is not always available. Sentences such as (3)
and (4) are not amenable to the conjunctive analysis proposed for (1).
(3) Bunsen and Kirchhoff laid the foundations of spectral analysis.
(4) The Romans conquered Gaul.
Frege remarked:
Here we must regard Bunsen and Kirchhoff as a whole. ‘The Romans
conquered Gaul’ must be conceived in the same way. The Romans here
are the Roman people, held together by custom, institutions, and laws.
(Frege, ibidem)
While Frege provided no additional indications as to the nature of the objects that
should serve as ‘wholes’ in the logical analysis of plurals, the subsequent literature
has offered a number of alternatives. Sets, mereological sums, and groups are just
some of the more popular candidates. By way of illustration, let us briefly consider
the appeal to sets.
The most famous advocate of this approach is Quine. One of the sentences he
grapples with is known as the Geach-Kaplan sentence.2
(GK) Some critics admire only one another.
According to Quine, by “invoking classes and membership, we can do justice to [the
Geach-Kaplan sentence]” (Quine 1982: 293). The regimentation Quine proposes
may be informally glossed as (5).3
(5) There is a non-empty set such that any member of the set is a critic who
admires some other member of the set.
(6) ∃s(∃x(x ∈ s) & ∀x(x ∈ s→ C(x)) &
∀x∀y[(x ∈ s & x admires y) → (y ∈ s & x 6= y)])
To understand what is distinctive about Quine’s position, consider the following
sentence, which appears to be a set-theoretic truism.
2As shown by Boolos, who credits David Kaplan, there is no paraphrase of this sentences com-
prising only singular vocabulary and the predicates occurring in it (Boolos 1984, 432-433).
3See Resnik 1988 for a similar view.
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(7) There are some sets that are self-identical, and every set that is not a member
of itself is one of them.
It is reasonable to demand that no proper regimentation of this sentence render it
obviously false.4 However, a strict application of Quine’s method of set-theoretic
paraphrase would turn (7) into (8), which is inconsistent with standard set-theoretic
principles.
(8) There is a non-empty set such that every member of it is a self-identical set,
and every set that is not a member of itself is a member of it.
James Higginbotham aptly labels this problem the paradox of plurality (Higgin-
botham 1998, 265). We will discuss this paradox and possible responses in section
3.
In linguistics, an influential approach to plurals is that of Godehard Link, who
uses mereological sums to analyze plurals. In his framework, the formal language
contains a special mereological relation (≤), corresponding to the notion of individ-
ual parthood: being an atomic part of. This notion is not to be confused with that of
material parthood: being a material part of. For example, while Annie is an atomic
part of the mereological sum (in the individual sense) of Annie and Bonnie, she is not
an atomic part of it in the material sense. So the plurality of Annie and Bonnie is the
mereological fusion of Annie and Bonnie taken as atomic individuals. Let ‘⊕’ stand
for the binary operation of mereological fusion relative to individual parthood. Let
σx.ϕ(x) be the mereological fusion of the individuals satisfying the formula ϕ(x).5
Then we may formalize some basic plural sentences as displayed below (see Link
1983, Link 1998, as well as Moltmann 1997 and Champollion forthcoming for more
details and applications of the framework).
(3) Bunsen and Kirchhoff laid the foundations of spectral analysis.
(3∗) F(b⊕ k)
(9) The Romans conquered Gaul.
(9∗) C(σx.R(x),g)
(7) There are some sets that are self-identical, and every set that is not a member
of itself is one of them.
4According to the view defended in Linnebo 2010, (7) is false—but only for non-obvious reasons
having to do with the ‘definiteness’ of any plurality, contrasted with the ‘indefiniteness’ of the notion
of a self-identical set.
5If desired, both fusion constructions can be defined in terms of the parthood relation ≤ by ex-
ploiting the fact that the fusion is the smallest object whose parts include the things to be fused.
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(7∗) ∃x [∀y (y≤ x → (Set(y) & y = y)) & ∀y ((Set(y) & y /∈ y) → y≤ x)]
A final ‘singularizing’ strategy we should mention is based on Davidson’s anal-
ysis of predication (hence also plural predication) in terms of events, broadly un-
derstood to include states (see Higginbotham and Schein 1989, Schein 1993, and
Moltmann’s chapter in this handbook). This approach enables us to eliminate a plu-
ral subject by reducing it to the single co-agents of the underlying event. To illustrate
it, let us look at the treatment of one Frege’s examples.
(3) Bunsen and Kirchhoff laid the foundations of spectral analysis.
(3∗∗) There is an event e of laying the foundations of spectral analysis such that
Bunsen is a co-agent of e, Kirchhoff is a co-agent of e, and there is no other
co-agent of e.
Are these ‘singularizing’ strategies successful? Many philosophical logicians
believe that the answer is negative. Some of their main arguments will be outlined in
section 3. First we will consider an altogether different analysis of plurals.
2 Taking plurals at face value
George Boolos championed an approach to plurals that completely rejects Frege’s
attempt to render plural discourse in terms of ‘wholes’.
Abandon, if one ever had it, the idea that use of plural forms must always
be understood to commit one to the existence of sets [...] of those things
to which the corresponding singular forms apply.
There are, of course, quite a lot of Cheerios in that bowl, well over two
hundred of them. But is there, in addition to the Cheerios, also a set of
them all? [...]
It is haywire to think that when you have some Cheerios, you are eating a
set [...]. [I]t doesn’t follow just from the fact that there are some Cheerios
in the bowl that, as some who theorize about the semantics of plurals
would have it, there is also a set of them all. (Boolos 1984: 448-49)
In fact, Boolos’s rejection of the singularizing approach has a distinguished pedigree
featuring, most prominently, Russell (1938) (see Klement 2014). Russell distin-
guished between a class as one and a class as many. A class as one is a multiplicity
of objects thought of as a single whole, as is done in traditional first-order set or class
theory. In contrast, a class as many is a multiplicity of objects as such. There is no
single entity that represents, collects, or goes proxy for the objects that make up the
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multiplicity. Russell emphasized the usefulness of the second way of thinking about
multiplicities. In more recent history, Black (1971) and Simons (1982, 1997) have
advocated a treatment of plurals in the spirit of classes as many. (Again, see Oliver
and Smiley 2013, chapter 2, for more historical details.)
What is the broader significance of Boolos’s attack on singularizing analyses and
of Russell’s much earlier non-singularizing approach based on the notion of classes
as many? At the heart of their remarks is the simple idea that plurals should be
taken at face value. That is, we should allow certain forms of plural discourse in
the regimentation of natural language. Frege, Quine, and others were simply wrong
to think that plurals need to be paraphrased away. Rather, plurals deserve to be
regimented in their own terms by employing a type distinction between singular and
plural expressions in the regimenting language. The standard implementation of this
proposal is known as plural logic.
2.1 The language of plural logic
We first introduce a formal language that may be used to regiment a wide range
of natural language uses of plurals. This language captures Boolos’s and Russell’s
suggestion and will enable us to represent many valid patterns of reasoning that es-
sentially involve plural expressions. The language is known in the philosophical
literature as PFO+, which is short for plural first-order logic plus plural predicates.
In one variant or another, it is the most common regimenting language for plurals in
philosophical logic.6
Start with the standard language of first-order logic. We expand this language by
making the following additions.
A. Plural variables (vv,xx,yy, . . ., and variously indexed variants thereof) and plu-
ral constants (aa,bb, . . ., and variants thereof), roughly corresponding to the
natural language pronoun ‘they’ and to plural proper names, respectively.
B. Quantifiers that bind plural variables (∀xx, ∃yy, . . . ).
C. A binary predicate ≺ for plural membership, corresponding to the natural lan-
guage ‘is one of’ or ‘is among’. This predicate is treated as logical.
D. Symbols for collective plural predicates with numerical superscripts repre-
senting the predicate’s arity: P1,P2, ...,Q1, ... (and variously indexed variants
thereof). Examples of collective plural predicates are ‘. . . cooperate’,‘. . . gather’,
‘. . . meet . . . ’, ‘. . . outnumber . . . ’. For economy, we leave the arity unmarked.
6For systems that employ the notation for variables adopted here, see Rayo 2002 and Linnebo
2003. An ancestor of this notation is found in Burgess and Rosen 1997. Variants include variables in
boldface (Oliver and Smiley), capitalized (McKay), or pluralized with an ‘s’ (Yi).
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The fragment of PFO+ containing items A-C, i.e. PFO+ minus plural predicates, is
known as PFO. The following chart summarizes which linguistic items are added to
the standard language of first-order logic to obtain PFO+.
natural language equivalent symbolization
plural variables they1, they2, ... vv, vv0, ... xx, ...
plural constants the Hebrides, the Channel Islands7 aa, bb, ... , aa1, ...
plural quantifier there are some (things) ∃vv, ∃xx, ...
plural membership is one of, is among ≺
collective plural are two, cooperate, T (vv), C(vv),
predicates met, wrote together M(vv), WT (vv,x)
The recursive clauses defining a well-formed formula are the obvious ones. However,
some clarifications about the language are in order.
Firstly, one may require a rigid distinction between the argument places of pred-
icates. An argument place that is open to a singular argument could be reserved
only to such arguments. A similar restriction could be imposed on argument places
open to plural arguments. Would this rigid distinction between singular and plural
argument places reflect a feature of natural language? Different natural language
predicates suggest different answers. Some predicates are flexible and are capable of
combining felicitously with both singular and plural terms. Examples include ‘own
a house’, ‘lifted a boat’, or, as in Frege’s example, ‘laid the foundations of spec-
tral analysis’. (Of course, the conjugations of the verbs will have to be adjusted.)
Other predicates appear to lack this flexibility and combine felicitously only with
plural terms, e.g. ‘cooperate with one another’ and ‘are two in number’. There is
7However, these purported examples are controversial, see Rumfitt 2005. Additional examples are
given in Oliver and Smiley 2013, 5.3.
Logic and Plurals 7
an interesting linguistic question as to the source of these felicity judgments: are
they of syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic origin? We don’t wish to take a stand on
these matters. For our purposes, we can leave things open, noting that the two kinds
of argument place—apparently flexible and apparently inflexible—suggest different
regimentation strategies, namely to admit flexible plural predicates, or not.
Secondly, collective plural predicates are contrasted with distributive ones, such
as ‘are prime’, ‘are students’, ‘have visited Rome’. Roughly speaking, these are
predicates that apply to a collection if and only if they apply to each of its members.
How best to make this precise will depend on one’s stand on the issue of flexible
plural predicates mentioned just above. If all plural predicates are allowed to be
flexible, then a plural predicate P is distributive just in case the following is analytic
(or near enough):
P(xx)↔∀x (x≺ xx→ P(x))
In the presence of inflexible plural predicates, however, a slight modification is
needed. Then a plural predicate P is distributive just in case its singular analogue
Ps is such that the following is analytic (or near enough):
P(xx)↔∀x(x≺ xx→ Ps(x))
If P has no singular analogue (as is arguably the case for ‘cooperate with one another’
and and ‘are two in number’), then P is collective by default.8
Distributive plural predicates in this sense may thus be obtained by paraphrase
from their corresponding singular forms. For this reason, distributive plural predi-
cates may be omitted from PFO+ without any loss of expressibility—although ad-
mittedly with some violence to style.
It might be helpful to close this section by providing some basic examples of
regimentation in PFO+.
(10) Some students cooperated.
(10′) ∃xx (S(xx) & C(xx))
(11) Bunsen and Kirchhoff laid the foundations of spectral analysis.
(2′) ∃xx (∀y (y≺ xx↔ (y = b ∨ y = k)) & L(xx))
(1) Some critics admire only one another.
(12) ∃xx (∀x(x≺ xx→C(x)) & ∀x∀y[(x≺ xx & A(x,y))→ (y≺ xx & x 6= y)])
8Notice that our definition of distributivity takes the form of (analytic) equivalences. Some authors
(e.g. McKay 2006, 6) tie distributivity solely to the left-to-right implication. For discussion and refer-
ences, see Oliver and Smiley 2013, 112-113. For an overview of linguistic treatments of distributivity,
see among others Winter and Scha 2015.
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2.2 The theory of plural logic
As a formal language, PFO+ comes equipped with logical rules of inference and ax-
ioms aimed at capturing correct reasoning in the fragment of natural language regi-
mented by this formal language. The rules associated with the singular vocabulary—
logical connectives and quantifiers—are the usual ones, i.e. introduction and elim-
ination rules for each logical expression. Plural quantifiers are associated with in-
troduction and elimination rules mirroring those for the singular quantifiers. Two
principles may be added. One captures the fact that pluralities are not empty:
(Non-empty) ∀xx ∃y y≺ xx
The other is an indiscernibility principle. It states that coextensive pluralities satisfy
the same formulas:
(Indiscernibly) ∀xx∀yy (∀x(x≺ xx ↔ x≺ yy) → (ϕ(xx) ↔ ϕ(yy)))
Finally, there is an additional principle sanctioning which pluralities there are.
This is the axiom schema of plural comprehension. For any formula ϕ(x) of PFO+
containing x free, we have the axiom stating that, if ϕ is satisfied by at least one
thing, then the things each of which satisfies ϕ(x) exist. The formula ϕ(x) may
contain parameters. So, in symbols, we have the universal closure of the following
axiom schema:
(P-Comp) ∃xϕ(x)→∃xx ∀y (y≺ xx ↔ ϕ(y))
The notion of derivation is defined inductively in the usual way as an appropriate
sequence of formulas.
2.3 The semantics of plural logic
The formal language of plural logic also comes equipped with a model-theoretic
semantics that captures the the notion of logical consequences in terms of models
(also called interpretations or structures): a sentence ϕ is the logical consequence of
some premises just in case there is no model of the language in which the premises
are true and ϕ is false. So the central task is to characterize a suitable notion of model
and a correlative notion of truth in a model (also called satisfaction).
Traditional model-theoretic semantics is based on set theory. A model is defined
as an ordered pair (d, f ), where d is a non-empty set representing the domain of
discourse of the model (i.e. what there is according to the model) and f is an inter-
pretation function from the non-logical terminology of the language to set-theoretic
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constructions based on d.9 Let JEK f be the denotation of the expression E according
to the function f (the relativization to f may be omitted when sufficiently clear from
context). A natural setup is one in which a proper name denotes an object in the
domain and a monadic predicate denotes a subset of the domain. So for any proper
name a and singular predicate S, the sentence S(a) is true in the model (d, f ) if and
only if JaK f ∈ JSK f .
There is an obvious way of extending this semantics to PFO and PFO+. The
interpretation function f can be augmented so that plural constants are assigned non-
empty subsets of the domain and (monadic) plural predicates are assigned sets of
subsets of the domain. The treatment of plural predication is then parallel to that
of singular predication: for any plural term aa and plural predicate P, the sentence
P(aa) is true in the model (d, f ) if and only if JaaK f ∈ JPK f . Plural membership is
treated as logical in that it is not subject to reinterpretation, always corresponding to
set-theoretic membership. A sentence of the form b≺ aa is true in the model (d, f )
if and only if JbK f ∈ JaaK f .
On the semantics just developed, plural logic has metalogical properties that dis-
tinguish from first-order logic. It is not compact, hence it is incomplete, and it fails
to have the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property.10
However, the set-theoretic model theory for PFO and PFO+ has received two
main criticisms. First, since plural terms are taken to denote sets, the semantics is
said to introduces ontological commitments which are arguably absent in ordinary
discourse. Second, by construing domains as sets, the set-theoretic model theory
rules out models whose domain is too big to form a set. This means that there are
no models that correspond to some intuitive interpretations of the language, such as
those with a domain of quantification encompassing absolutely everything.11
As a reaction to these criticisms, an alternative approach to the semantics of PFO
and PFO+ has gained increasing popularity. Instead of letting the values of plural
terms be subsets of the first-order domain, the semantic values of plural terms are
represented by plural terms in the metalanguage. A plural term now stands for many
objects. To state this view, one needs of course to make use of plural resources in the
metalanguage. This semantic proposal traces back to Boolos (1985) who insisted that
the value of a plural variable not be a set (or any kind of set-like object). For him a
plural variable has many values from the ordinary, first-order domain and thus ranges
plurally over it. Boolos’s new approach may be called plurality-based semantics to
9The logical terminology is not subject to reinterpretation. Its meanings are characterized induc-
tively through the characterization of the notion of truth in a model.
10For an explanation of these properties, see any advanced introduction to logic, e.g. Enderton
2002.
11Since the completeness theorem fails for plural logic with standard semantics, the famous Kreisel
‘squeezing argument’ (Kreisel 1967) is not available. See Rayo and Williamson 2003 for discussion.
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highlight the contrast with the set-based semantics described above.
How are the criticisms to the set-based semantics avoided on the plurality-based
approach? First, since plural terms no longer denote sets, the charge of introduc-
ing spurious ontological commitments to sets does not arise. A plural term denotes
many objects as such, without the need of collecting those object into a single en-
tity. Second, by using plural resources in the metalanguage one may define a domain
of quantification to be some things rather than a set. In turn, this enables one to
capture a domain of quantification encompassing absolutely everything. That would
be the domain consisting of the things such that everything is among them, which
can be obtained by plural comprehension. Therefore, the plurality-based semantics
sidesteps the two main criticisms leveled against the set-based approach.
In closing this section, we would like to make two further remarks. First, the
plurality-based semantics sanctions the same metalogical properties as the set-based
semantics. In particular, the resulting logic is not compact, is incomplete, and it
fails to have the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property. Second, these metalogical properties,
both in the case of the plurality-based semantics and in the case of the set-based se-
mantics, depend on a standard treatment of quantification according to which plural
quantifiers range over all subpluralities or all non-empty subsets of the first-order
domain. But there is a non-standard (i.e. Henkin) treatment of plural logic. By al-
lowing quantification over some but not all subpluralities of the first-order domain, or
some but not all subsets of the first-order domain), we obtain respectively a Henkin
plurality-based semantics and a Henkin set-based semantics (see Florio and Linnebo
forthcoming).
3 Arguments against singularizing strategies
Plural logic provides an appealing alternative to the singularizing strategies surveyed
in section 1. But is the resort to plural logic inevitable? Can we successfully analyze
plurals by paraphrasing them away according to one of those strategies? Singulariz-
ing approaches face some serious objections.
The argument from incorrect existential consequences points out that, for a broad
range of singularizing approaches, some translations will have first-order existential
consequences that the initial plural sentence appears not to have. In those cases,
we are able to transition as a matter of logic from some objects to some sort of
‘collection’ or single object that comprises or somehow represents those objects.
But a number of examples suggest that this transition is not always licit. Consider
these following sentences.
(13) Bill and Hillary are two. (Yi 1999)
(14) Russell and Whitehead wrote Principia Mathematica. (Oliver and Smiley
2001)
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Set-theoretic and mereological paraphrases offer translations along the following
lines.
(15) {Bill, Hillary} is two-membered.
(16) Russell⊕Whitehead wrote∗ Principia Mathematica.
where ‘wrote∗’ stands for the appropriate mereological rendering of the predicate
‘wrote’. Thus, in both cases the translation has a singular existential consequence
that is intuitively neither a consequence of (13) or (14).
(17) There is a set or there is a mereological sum.
Boolos proposed a famous variant of this argument when he remarked ‘I am eating
some Cheerios’ does not logically entail ‘I am eating a set’ (Boolos 1984, 72).
Another argument is the paradox of plurality introduced in section 1. It purports
to show that plausible singularizing strategies are bound to regiment intuitively true
sentences of the object language as logical falsehoods (Boolos 1984, Lewis 1991,
Schein 1993, Higginbotham 1998, Oliver and Smiley 2001, Oliver and Smiley 2013,
Rayo 2002, and McKay 2006).
While the paradox of plurality threatens a wide array of singularizing strategies, it
does not threaten all of such strategies. Notably, the mereological approach escapes
the paradox. The argument assumes that the relation regimenting plural member-
ship is not reflexive. Unlike the set-theoretic singularist, the mereological singularist
need not grant this assumption. She can model plural membership by means of the
reflexive relation of individual parthood (≤).
However, the very feature that immunizes the mereological approach from the
paradox of plurality also makes it vulnerable to another sort of objection. According
to this objection, mereology doesn’t have the resources to represent the more com-
plex structure associated with plural expressions, thus validating intuitively invalid
inferences. In particular, the mereological singularist faces difficulties when regi-
menting plural talk involving the very mereological notions that are at the core of
her regimentation strategy. In such cases, there can be more structure than can be
represented by the mereological strategy (see, e.g., Schein 1993, Oliver and Smiley
2001, and Rayo 2002).
The criticisms against singularizing strategies have varying degrees of force.
Whether or not they are ultimately compelling, we hope that this brief exposition
will suffice to appreciate the standard motivations for plural logic.
4 Logicality and plural logic
One of the central disputes about plural logic concerns its status as logic. Does the
logical system outlined above qualify as “pure logic”? Since the debate about what
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counts as pure logic is vast, we cannot do full justice to it here. Rather, we focus on
three important marks of logicality: topic-neturality, formality, and epistemic access.
The requirement of topic-neutrality is based on a simple, intuitive idea, namely
that logical principles should be applicable to reasoning about any subject matter.
In contrast, other principles are only applicable to particular domains of individuals.
The laws of physics, for instance, concern the physical world and cannot be applied
to reasoning about natural numbers or other abstract entities. Plural logic seems to
satisfy this intuitive notion of topic-neturality. The validity of the principles of plural
logic do not appear to be restricted to specific domain of individuals.
Another mark of logicality is formality. Logical principles are often thought to
hold in virtue of their form, and not of their content. There are different ways of
articulating the notion of formality, some of which are connected to the notion of
topic-neutrality just discussed (see MacFarlane 2000). However, the following con-
ditions are commonly associated with formality. The first is that formal principles are
ontologically innocent: they do not commit us to the existence of particular objects.
The second is that formal principles are unable to discriminate between objects: they
cannot single out particular objects or classes thereof.
Is plural logic ontologically innocent? In particular, are plural quantifiers onto-
logically innocent? The traditional answer to these questions is affirmative. Plural
logic indeed originated as an ontologically innocent alternative to second-order logic,
a system that adds to first-order logic quantification into predicate position (Boolos
1984, Boolos 1985). This view is sustained by the plurality-based semantics de-
veloped in section 2.3. According to that semantics, plural quantifiers do not range
over a special domain of plural entities. They range plurally over entities in the
domain of the singular quantifiers and thus do not introduce commitments beyond
those incurred by the first-order quantifiers.12 However, both earlier critics of the
ontological innocence of plural logic (e.g. Parsons 1990, Hazen 1993, and Shapiro
1993) and more recent ones (Linnebo 2003, Florio and Linnebo forthcoming) have
emphasized that the conclusion follows only if ontological innocence is understood
in terms of commitments to objects, i.e. to entities in the range of the first-order
quantifiers. However, there is a broader notion of ontological commitment tied to
the presence of existential quantifiers of any logical category in a sentence’s truth
conditions. According to this notion, plural locutions incur additional ontological
commitments even on a plurality-based semantics. The resulting view is an analogue
of that espoused by Frege when he held that quantification into predicate position
incurs its own distinctive kind of commitment, not to objects but rather to (what he
called) concepts.
Another condition on formality is that formal principles should not discriminate
12Note that the picture is different if one adopts the set-based semantics or attempts to regiment
plurals along one of the singularizing strategies presented in section 1.
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between objects. A standard way of making the condition precise is to claim that log-
ical principles are those that remain true no matter how the non-logical expressions
of the language are reinterpreted. This presupposes a distinction between logical
and non-logical expressions of the language, which is typically captured by defining
logical notions in terms of isomorphism invariance (e.g. Tarski 1986, Sher 1991,
and McGee 1996) and then characterizing as logical the expressions that are suitably
related to logical notions.13 The notions corresponding to plural quantification and
plural membership come out as logical on this account.
The last mark of logicality we would like to consider concerns epistemic ac-
cess. It is often thought one must be able to grasp and accept logical principles (and
logical notions) without relying on non-logical principles (or notions). Moreover,
logical truths, if knowable, must be knowable independently of non-logical truths.
In the context of plural logic, the prime suspect has been plural comprehension (see
Linnebo 2003). The claim is that our knowledge and acceptance of plural compre-
hension is mediated by our knowledge and acceptance of set theory.
5 Plural logic and second-order logic
Both plural logic and second-order logic have found a number of philosophical appli-
cations. As first shown by Boolos, monadic second-order logic can be interpreted in
PFO. The converse is true as well: PFO can be interpreted in monadic second-order
logic. So, from a syntactic point of view, the two theories are equivalent. In light of
this equivalence, one question (also relevant in the context of collective intentional-
ity) is whether there is a genuine choice between them. When considering particular
applications, are they interchangeable? Could plural logic be replaced by second-
order logic in the formalization of talk about collections or collective entities? Or
should one system be preferred over the other?
One reason to keep the two systems separate concerns natural language. Plural
logic is typically motivated by the need to capture natural language plurals while
avoiding the problems incurred by the singularizing strategies. Second-order logic
can be said to enjoy the same motivation. There are examples strongly suggestive
of variable binding of predicate positions (e.g. ‘John is everything we wanted him
to be’, see Higginbotham 1998, 251, and Rayo and Yablo 2001), which includes
predicate positions of plural predicates (‘John and Mary are everything we wanted
them to be’). Thus plural logic and second-order logic might be needed as distinct
formalisms for the regimentation of natural language.
Another reason to keep the two systems separate is that, as naturally interpreted,
13Denoting a logical notion has been claimed to be necessary but not sufficient for an expression
to be logical. An additional semantic connection would be required (as argued, for instance, by Mc-
Carthy 1981 and McGee 1996; see also Sagi forthcoming for a critical evaluation of these arguments).
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the semantic values of plural and second-order terms seem to have different modal
profiles. While pluralities are modally rigid, properties are not. Compare the follow-
ing sentences, where ‘them’ in (18) refers to Annie and Bonnie.
(18) Annie is one of them but might not have been.
(19) Annie is a philosopher but might not have been.
While (18) appears to be false, (19) does not. This is symptomatic of the fact that
we regard pluralities as modally rigid: if x is one of xx, then necessarily x is one of
xx. In the jargon of possible worlds, we may say that pluralities retain their members
across worlds (for more details, see Rumfitt 2005, Williamson 2010, Uzquiano 2011;
an unorthodox view is defended by Hewitt 2012). Not so for all properties. Some
properties do not retain their members across worlds. For instance, the property of
being a philosopher has a non-empty extension but might have had an empty one.
Further readings
The classic references for Boolos’s pioneering work on plural logical are Boolos
1984 and Boolos 1985. More recent developments include Yi 1999, Oliver and Smi-
ley 2001, Rayo 2002, and Linnebo 2003, Yi 2005, and Yi 2006. There are three
philosophical monographs on plurals, all embracing plural logic: Yi 2002, McKay
2006, and Oliver and Smiley 2013. The latter is the most comprehensive philosoph-
ical treatment of the subject to date.
There is also a rich literature on plurals in linguistic semantics. Among the most
influential works, often adopting a singularizing approach, are Link 1998, Schein
1993, Schwarzschild 1996, and Landman 2000.
The interested reader is also invited to consult the bibliographies of Ritchie’s and
Moltmann’s chapters in this handbook.
References
Black, M.: 1971, The elusiveness of sets, Review of Metaphysics 24, 614–636.
Boolos, G.: 1984, To be is to be a value of a variable (or to be some values of some
variables), Journal of Philosophy 81, 430–449.
Boolos, G.: 1985, Nominalist platonism, Philosophical Review 94, 327–344.
Burgess, J. and Rosen, G.: 1997, A Subject with No Object. Strategies for Nominal-
istic Interpretations of Mathematics, Oxford University Press.
Logic and Plurals 15
Champollion, L.: forthcoming, Parts of a Whole: Distributivity as a Bridge Between
Aspect and Measurement, Oxford University Press.
Enderton, H. B.: 2002, A Mathematical Introduction to Logic, Academic Press.
Florio, S.: 2014a, Unrestricted quantification, Philosophy Compass 9, 441–454.
Florio, S.: 2014b, Untyped pluralism, Mind 123, 317–337.
Florio, S. and Linnebo, Ø.: forthcoming, On the innocence and determinacy of plural
quantification, Nouˆs .
Frege, G.: 1980, Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, Basil Blackwell.
Hazen, A.: 1993, Against pluralism, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71, 132–
144.
Hewitt, S.: 2012, Modalising plurals, Journal of Philosophical Logic 41, 853–875.
Higginbotham, J.: 1998, On higher-order logic and natural language, in T. Smiley
(ed.), Philosophical Logic, Oxford University Press, pp. 1–27.
Higginbotham, J. and Schein, B.: 1989, Plurals, in J. Carter and R.-M. Dechaine
(eds), Proceedings of the North East Linguistics Society, pp. 161–175.
Klement, K. C.: 2014, Early russell on types and plurals, Journal for the History of
Analytical Philosophy 2, 1–21.
Kreisel, G.: 1967, Informal rigour and completeness proofs, in I. Lakatos (ed.), Prob-
lems in the Philosophy of Mathematics, North Holland, pp. 38–186.
Landman, F.: 2000, Events and Plurality, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Lewis, D.: 1991, Parts of Classes, Basil Blackwell.
Link, G.: 1983, The logical analysis of plurals and mass terms: A lattice-theoretical
approach, in R. Ba¨uerle, C. Schwarze and A. von Stechov (eds), Meaning, Use
and the Interpretation of Language, De Gruyter, pp. 303–323.
Link, G.: 1998, Algebraic Semantics in Language and Philosophy, CSLI Publica-
tions.
Linnebo, Ø.: 2003, Plural quantification exposed, Nouˆs 37, 71–92.
Linnebo, Ø.: 2010, Pluralities and sets, Journal of Philosophy 107, 144–164.
Linnebo, Ø. and Nicolas, D.: 2008, Superplurals in English, Analysis 68, 186–197.
Logic and Plurals 16
Linnebo, Ø. and Rayo, A.: 2012, Hierarchies ontological and ideological, Mind
121, 269–308.
MacFarlane, J.: 2000, What Does It Mean to Say That Logic Is Formal?, PhD thesis,
University of Pittsburgh.
McCarthy, T.: 1981, The idea of a logical constant, Journal of Philosophy 78, 499–
523.
McGee, V.: 1996, Logical operations, Journal of Philosophical Logic 25, 567–580.
McKay, T. J.: 2006, Plural Predication, Oxford University Press.
Moltmann, F.: 1997, Parts and Wholes in Semantics, Oxford University Press.
Oliver, A. and Smiley, T.: 2001, Strategies for a logic of plurals, Philosophical Quar-
terly 51, 289–306.
Oliver, A. and Smiley, T.: 2005, Plural descriptions and many-valued functions, Mind
114, 1039–1068.
Oliver, A. and Smiley, T.: 2013, Plural Logic, Oxford University Press.
Parsons, C.: 1990, The structuralist view of mathematical objects, Synthese 84, 303–
346.
Parsons, C.: 2013, Some consequences of the entanglement of logic and mathemat-
ics, in M. Frauchiger (ed.), Reference, Rationality, and Phenomenology. Themes
from Føllesdal, pp. 153–178.
Quine, W. V.: 1982, Methods of Logic, Fourth edn, Harvard University Press.
Rayo, A.: 2002, Word and objects, Nouˆs 36, 436–464.
Rayo, A.: 2006, Beyond plurals, in A. Rayo and G. Uzquiano (eds), Absolute Gen-
erality, Oxford University Press, pp. 220–254.
Rayo, A. and Williamson, T.: 2003, A completeness theorem for unrestricted first-
order languages, in J. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps, Oxford University Press.
Rayo, A. and Yablo, S.: 2001, Nominalism through de-nominalization, Nouˆs 35, 74–
92.
Resnik, M.: 1988, Second-order logic still wild, Journal of Philosophy 85, 75–87.
Rumfitt, I.: 2005, Plural terms: Another variety of reference?, in J. L. Bermu´dez
(ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of
Gareth Evans, Oxford University Press, pp. 84–123.
Logic and Plurals 17
Russell, B.: 1938, The Principles of Mathematics, Second edn, Norton.
Sagi, G.: forthcoming, The modal and epistemic arguments against the invariance
criterion for logical terms, Journal of Philosophy .
Schein, B.: 1993, Plurals and Events, MIT Press.
Schwarzschild, R.: 1996, Pluralities, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Shapiro, S.: 1993, Modality and ontology, Mind 102, 455–481.
Sher, G.: 1991, The Bounds of Logic: A Generalized Viewpoint, MIT Press.
Simons, P.: 1982, Plural reference and set theory, in Barry Smith (ed.), Parts and
Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, Philosophia Verlag.
Simons, P.: 1997, Higher-order quantification and ontological commitment, dialec-
tica 51, 255–271.
Tarski, A.: 1986, What are logical notions?, History and Philosophy of Logic 7, 143–
154.
Uzquiano, G.: 2011, Plural quantification and modality, Proceedings of the Aris-
totelian Society 111, 219–250.
Williamson, T.: 2010, Necessitism, contingentism, and plural quantification, Mind
119, 657–748.
Winter, Y. and Scha, R.: 2015, Plurals, in S. Lappin and C. Fox (eds), The Handbook
of Contemporary Semantic Theory, 2nd edn, Wiley-Blackwell.
Yablo, S.: 2006, Circularity and paradox, in Thomas Bolander et alii (ed.), Self-
Reference, CSLI Pulications.
Yi, B.-U.: 1999, Is two a property?, Journal of Philosophy 96, 163–190.
Yi, B.-U.: 2002, Understanding the Many, Routledge.
Yi, B.-U.: 2005, The logic and meaning of plurals. Part I, Journal of Philosophical
Logic 34, 459–506.
Yi, B.-U.: 2006, The logic and meaning of plurals. Part II, Journal of Philosophical
Logic 35, 239–288.
